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Revisiting Kant and Fichte’s
Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism
Emiliano Acosta
1 In this paper, I present some preliminary considerations on relevant, but, as far as I
know,  still  unexplored,  aspects  of  the  Kantian  and  Fichtean  conceptions  of
cosmopolitanism. These aspects can be grouped in three thematic axes: the ontologico-
political  (not  legal)  side  of  the  cosmopolitan conceptions  of  both philosophers,  the
existence of a diversity of forms of cosmopolitanism in Fichte’s philosophy, and the
idea and role of nature, economy and history in Kant and Fichte’s cosmopolitanism.1
2 Recent Kant-studies have shown that contrary to the traditional approach exclusively
focused  on  Kant’s  theory  of  international  order  (legal  cosmopolitanism),  Kant  also
offers an economic, religious, epistemological and moral account on cosmopolitanism.2
Nevertheless, these new interpretations leave the Kantian ontologico-political version
of cosmopolitanism aside. The reason of this systematic omission seems to be the little
attention these studies have given to what I  consider the conceptual core of Kant’s
article  of  1784  Idea  for  a  Universal  History  with  a  Cosmopolitan  Aim,  namely  Kant’s
postulate of an ontological continuity from nature to reason aiming at legitimating a
political praxis of cultural, political and moral progress and emancipation.3
3 Concerning Fichte’s theory of cosmopolitanism, research has always been focused on
the tensions between nationalism and/or patriotism and cosmopolitanism in Fichte’s
political  and legal philosophy, leaving the question aside whether Fichte,  like Kant,
does  not  conceive  of  cosmopolitanism  in  very  different  perspectives.4 The  recent
published Cambridge Companion to Fichte shows that Fichte’s cosmopolitanism has been
displaced in the last years from the set of main problems concerning the study of the
work of this philosopher.5
4 The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  I  will  begin  with  an  analysis  of  Kant’s
epistemological cosmopolitanism and show that Cavallar’s reconstruction of this form
of cosmopolitanism needs to be improved. This will lead me to the explanation of the
ontologico-political  side of  the Kantian cosmopolitanism. I  will  mainly focus on the
mentioned article Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim (from now on IaG). I
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will argue that at the background of Kant’s cosmopolitanism there is a grand narrative
about nature, historicity and destination (Bestimmung) of the individuals and Humanity.
This grand narrative, which can be understood as the ideological moment in Kant’s
cosmopolitanism,  consists,  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  postulate  of  the  existence  of  a
cosmopolitan germ and a cosmopolitan natural disposition in man, on the other of the
postulate  of  the  existence  of  a  plan  of  nature  guiding  the  history  of  progress  of
Humanity. In the second part of the present paper, I will examine the way Fichte deals
with the ontological and political question of cosmopolitanism in his Philosophy of Right
(1796/97), The Closed Commercial State (1800) and his Letters to Konstant (1802/03). I will
begin with the question whether and to  what  extent  we could talk  about  different
forms  of  cosmopolitanism  in  Fichte’s  philosophy  and  show  to  what  extent  this  is
possible. I will argue that Fichte considers cosmopolitanism an issue that exceeds the
domain  of  philosophy  of  right,  since  his  idea  of  cosmopolitanism  encompasses  a
political economy, a philosophy of education and culture as well as a political ontology
of the cosmopolitan, since she is essentially or stricto sensu the one who has no or has
lost his/her citizenship. In the third section I will advance some conclusions that can
serve for outlining the tasks a new research on Kant and Fichte’s cosmopolitanisms
should undertake.
 
On Kant’s cosmopolitanisms
5 No doubt,  Kleingeld and Cavallar’s  studies on Kant’s cosmopolitanism represent the
most important recent contribution to the Kant-scholarship on this topic. Kleingeld’s
historiographic research on Kant’s Cosmopolitanism has shown that besides the well-
known  Kantian  legal  cosmopolitanism,  Kant  has  also  developed  a  religious,  moral,
cultural  and  economic  notion  of  cosmopolitanism.  One  of  the  most  important
contributions  of  Cavallar  to  Kleingeld’s  research  has  been  the  identification  of  a
Kantian epistemological cosmopolitanism.6 Nevertheless, on the one hand in his article
of 2012 Cavallar only mentions the existence of this form of cosmopolitanism and gives
a brief description of it, leaving it aside from the scope of his paper7 and, on the other,
in his book, published in 2015, Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism he does not discuss the
epistemological cosmopolitanism one can find in Kant’s IaG. Instead, Cavallar’s analysis
of  Kant’s  epistemological  cosmopolitanism refers  to  other  Kantian writings  such as
Anthropology, the first and third critiques, Kant’s lectures on the philosophical doctrine
of  religion  and  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals.  Kant’s  article  from  1784  is  certainly
mentioned, but a few pages below and merely as an illustration of the concept Cavallar
has already reconstructed out of the above-mentioned writings.8 Contrary to Cavallar’s
reading I do not consider the epistemological cosmopolitanism of Kant’s article of 1784
as just an example of what Kant has said in other writings.
6 Cavallar’s omission of the particularity of the epistemological cosmopolitanism in IaG
results to my view in a misreading of Kant’s epistemological cosmopolitanism, since it
gives the impression that, on the one hand, Kant’s epistemological cosmopolitanism is a
kind of neutral or objective point of view or skeptical moment that makes possible
inter-cultural dialogue, self-criticism9 and global thinking in terms of openness towards
others.10 Contrary to Kant’s idea that what a cosmopolitan distinguishes from ordinary
citizens  is  his  or  her  active  engagement  with  the  world,  namely  that  a  real
cosmopolitan  is  not  a  mere  “spectator  of  world  events”  (Weltsbechauer)11, Cavallar
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affirms  that  epistemological  cosmopolitans  are  according  to  Kant  “impartial
spectators”.12 Furthermore, Cavallar’s consideration of Kant’s cosmopolitan perspective
as  an  unbiased way  of  thinking  that  permits  individuals  to  overcome  their  own
ethnocentrism produces the illusion that Kant is an ally of contemporary humanitarian
cosmopolitan theories like Ulrich Beck’s view on cosmopolitanism.13 On the other hand,
this  misreading  suggests  the  existence  of  a  kind  of  natural  transit  between
epistemological  and  moral  cosmopolitanism  in  Kant’s  philosophy.14 This  systematic
transit becomes impossible, as Cavallar himself once recognized,15 if we introduce in
the  notion  of  epistemological  cosmopolitanism  the  particular  no-moral  and  anti-
theological character of the version in IaG. The absence of a moral principle leading his
philosophy of history and the strong anti-theological and secularized character of the
notion of cosmopolitanism in the article of 178416 makes impossible the compatibility of
Kant’s  moral  and religious cosmopolitanism with his  cosmopolitanism based on his
philosophy of history.
7 Although Kant’s epistemological cosmopolitanism consists indeed of overcoming the
egoist or ethnocentric perspective, this overcoming does not lead according to Kant to
a neutral point of view, but to one engaged with a particular view of the nature, the
history  and  the  destination  of  human  beings.  By  elevating  herself  upon  the
particularity  of  the own historical  and cultural  situation,  the Kantian cosmopolitan
does not obtain a decontaminated perspective on human affairs,  but a new view on
human history, human nature and human destination. The cosmopolitan is according
to the IaG the one who has grasped the real goal of Humanity, the real mechanism of
nature and history and, accordingly, can distinguish between a politics for and a one
against the progress of Humanity.17 Kant is convinced, and Fichte would agree, that
above  particular  interests  there  is  no  uninterested  objectivity,  but  the  interest  of
reason with its own political and moral agenda.18
8 The particularity and/or partiality of Kant’s point of view can be noticed not only in his
acknowledgment  of  the  epistemologically  fragile  status  of  his  own  proposal  for
philosophically interpreting history, which is nothing more than “a thought of what a
philosophical head […] could try from a different point of view”19, but also in the fact
that his discourse does not attempt at representing the totality of human beings. His
discourse  in  the  name  of  Humanity is  articulated  in  open  confrontation  against
conservative, i.e. anti-Enlightenment, discourses about the human nature, its history
and destination.20
9 Kant speaks in the name of a Humanity that for constituting itself as totality needs to
exclude a part of itself.  The opposition “us and them” is not an accidental collateral
effect. This opposition is inherent to every totalizing discourse. The totality Kant refers
to  with  his  discourse  in  the  name  of  Humanity  cannot  be  objectively  or  logically
achieved, but only rhetorically. Put in Laclau’s terms: Kant’s cosmopolitan discourse of
1784 is an attempt at creating a new universality in terms of hegemony.21 Concerning
epistemological cosmopolitanism, Kant is in his 1784 article neither neutral nor affirms
that  his  cosmopolitan  idea  is  objectively  true  and  universal  valid.  The  same
philosophical modesty can be found in his Perpetual Peace, where Kant acknowledges
that the advice of jurists is for the political authorities more important than the advice
of  philosophers  and  so  he  rejects  Plato’s  idea  of  the  philosopher  king.22 Cavallar’s
interpretation becomes more problematic when we realize that Kant’s epistemological
cosmopolitanism has nothing to do with humanism or humanitarianism nor with inter-
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cultural dialogue or openness to diversity, since it is based on both a philosophy of
history that considers Humanity and not the individual as the real subject of history23
and a notion of culture that could not tolerate contemporary pleas for cultural and
religious diversity.24
10 We can now discuss to what extent Kant’s Idea for a Universal History is relevant for a
reconstruction of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Kleingeld offers a consistent argument for
leaving this  article  aside:  in  his  Towards  Perpetual  Peace  Kant has  changed his  mind
about the definitive form and the coercive power of the federation of nations.25 No
doubt this is correct. But Kleingeld did not say anything about the things that have not
changed in Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism since 1784, namely that the main ideas of
Kant’s philosophy of history in 1784 and 1795/96 are actually the same. In both writings
we read that nature is a kind of secularized providence and that the motor of history is
the social unsociability of man conceived essentially as a natural process, namely, as a
process  planed and ordered by  nature,  unwittingly  executed by  human beings  and
striving at the realization of the goals of nature in the human race.26 By the way: the
same idea we find at the end of Kant’s Anthropology, published in 1798.27
11 The neglected particularity of Kant’s 1784 version of epistemological cosmopolitanism
consists  of  being based on an ontologization of  the cosmopolitan point of  view.  This
ontology is essentially political, since it is related to a very specific political program:
the establishment of a cosmopolitan legal order by means of making republicanism the
universal  form  of  government.  Kant’s  attempt  consists  of  demonstrating  that  this
political  program  corresponds  to  the  natural  development  of  human  beings.  The
cosmopolitan, the historiographer who discovers the real dynamics of history, human
reason,  moral  feelings,  political  institutions  are  all,  like  Newton,  Kepler  and  their
discoveries, products of nature.28
12 Kant’s 1784 cosmopolitanism encompasses the development of a grand narrative about
human  nature,  destination  and  history  aiming  at  mobilizing  people  to  actively
participate in the progress of Humanity. According to Kant, this progress is however a
natural progress and, since natural and necessary are within the Kantian universe two
sides of same coin, something that soon or later will happen. Why then? Kant’s answer
reads as follows: because Nature is wise, she knows what she wants and she knows how
she  can  get  it  and  she  has  the  power  and  the  means  (the  human  creatures)  for
achieving it.29 But, if this is so, why should we try to convince people to actively take
part on something that necessarily and without people’s own consent will become one
day a reality? This is the point where Kant sounds a little bit Hegelian and Marxist,
since on the one hand the history of human progress has the character of necessity and
on the other the future is already written. The cunning of nature we can discover in
history,  when  we  observe  human  actions  from  a  cosmopolitan  point  of  view,30
guarantees that nature will work on the same way in the future. By the way: the
guarantee of perpetual peace is, according to Kant, not human rationality nor human
freedom, but, as we read in his Perpetual Peace, the wisdom and manipulative power of
nature connected of course with social  antagonism, which is  a means of nature for
accomplishing her (not our) last goal.31
13 So,  at  this  point  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  subjectivities  should  be  persuaded  and
mobilized for consciously working on the progress of the human race and consequently
of nature understood as the totality of living species on earth. Kant would agree with
this.  But  the  point  is  that  Kant  suggests  that,  as  soon as  we decipher  the  internal
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mechanism  and  goal  of  nature,  we  can  accelerate the  dynamics  of  the  necessity-
structure of history.32
14 One of the reasons Kant gives for legitimating his idea of universal history is that his
grand  narrative  can  convince  people  for  actively  contributing  to  the  progress  of
humanity and so the tempo of history will be faster and we will sooner bring humanity
to her goal. So, it is not the point whether his proposal is objectively true, but whether
it can mobilize people. Kant thinks that for this purpose he has to develop a kind of
political  ontology,  namely  a  description of  human nature  where  the  political  is  an
essential part of the human nature. This is why he considers necessary to detach the
human being from the idea of metaphysical freedom and transcendence, namely from
all that can lead individuals to relativize this life, this earth, and, consequently, make
cosmopolitan activism unattractive. So, in IaG he proposes to conceive the human, its
history and destination within a framework of secularization and absolute immanence
in  order  to  make  consistent  and  desirable  his  idea  of  ontologico-political
cosmopolitanism.
15 Kant’s philosophy of history can be seen as an example of Enlightenment secularization
of the Christian history of salvation. But Kant thinks that his proposal is even in the
context  of  the  Enlightenment  original.  This  is  the  reason why he  thinks  he  has  to
explain what Johann Schultz had mentioned in the Gotha Learned Papers, namely that
“favorite idea of professor Kant that the final end of humankind is the attainment of
the  most  perfect  political  constitution”  and that  Kant  “wishes  that  a  philosophical
historiographer would undertake to provide us in this respect a history of humanity,
and to show how far humanity has approached this final end in different ages, or how
far removed it has been from it, and what is still to be done for this attainment.”33
16 I think that Kant’s originality resides in the fact that Kant secularizes the history of
salvation  without  cancelling  its  teleological  character  and  consequently  without
abandoning the idea of a plan and a task for humanity nor cancelling the function of
providence in this history. But Kant translates providence: we have to say “nature”34;
and instead of “divine intention” (“göttliche Absicht”), a term from eighteenth-century
German theology for “intentio divina”,35 we have now to say “cosmopolitan intention
or aim” (“weltbürgerliche Absicht”). This notion of cosmopolitanism is, to my view, what
Kant thinks it  has to be explained,  since this is  the point Schultz did not mention.
Furthermore,  for  Kant  the  opposition  in  the  cultural  struggle  for  the  progress  of
humanity is not the theological opposition between the children of Heaven and the
sons  of  the  Earth,  but  the  secularized  antagonism  between  the  last  ones  and  the
cosmopolitan, as we read it in his Reflections on the Anthropology.36
17 In this manuscript, we find Kant’s consideration of cosmopolitanism as a standpoint
opposed to the egoist way of being in the world. But Kant considers this perspective as
necessarily  connected  with  interest  and  action  as  well:  the  cosmopolitan  is,  as
mentioned above, not a “world-spectator” nor a strange or sojourner in the world, she
considers the world as her own place for living. There is thus no another world for the
cosmopolitan. As Kant says at the end of IaG: it is all about convincing people to stop
looking for the solutions beyond earthly existence.37 Kant notes that the idea of the
immortality  of  the  soul  is  actually  an  obstacle  for  Enlightenment  conceived  as
cosmopolitan activism. In this point Kant’s secularization of the history of salvation
differs from Herder’s account on it. As Kant notices in his review of Herder’s Ideas for a
philosophy of history of the humankind, one of the main problems of Herder’s philosophy
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of history is  the extension and projection of  human moral  development beyond the
limits of this life and this earth.38
18 Kant’s epistemological cosmopolitanism is something more than what Cavallar tells us
about this concept, since it encompasses a political ontology. The political idea of a
cosmopolitan order or of a praxis towards perpetual peace are essentially a result of
the historical development of a natural disposition in the human being. In defining the
oscillating  nature  of  human  beings  at  the  beginning  of  IaG  Kant  does  not  situate
individuals between animals guided by instincts and moral free beings, but between the
former and the cosmopolitan as the individual who has grasped that the human is a
nature  creature  destined  to  achieve  a  specific  goal  of  nature:  the  establishment  of
international legal order as the basis for the total development of the potentialities of
humankind. Again: this life, this earth, are the limits.
19 For creating a horizon of absolute immanence Kant advances an apagogical argument
by  means  of  which  he,  on  the  one  hand,  demonstrates  that  metaphysical  freedom
cannot be the principle or guiding idea for entering in the historicity of the human
being, on the other, Kant postulates a history of humanity as guided by nature as the
only consistent way for writing a non-chaotic, teleological, history of human kind.39 In
this regard, the philosophical historiographer is a cosmopolitan who, like Newton and
Kepler, incarnates a moment of self-reflection and self-knowledge of nature.
20 The cosmopolitan is the incarnation of an idea nature has put as potentiality in the
human  nature.  Kant  talks  in  IaG  about  a  cosmopolitan  germ  and  a  cosmopolitan
disposition.40 An  idea  translated  in  biologist  terms.  Kant  is,  nevertheless,  not  a
materialist.  We  can  say  that  his  ontologization  of  cosmopolitanism  naturalizes
cosmopolitanism  and  politics,  but  we  also  have  to  say  that  the  nature  of  this
naturalization is not the nature of the first critique nor the nature of the third one. As
already said: nature is providence.41
21 For  nature,  we  are  nothing  but  an  instrument.  The  real  subject  of  history  is  the
humankind.42 It is quite interesting to pay attention to Kant’s argument in this regard,
because it has the same structure of the argument of the second critique for postulating
the  immortality  of  soul.43 In  both  cases,  something  impossible  to  be  accomplished
within the limits of individual earthly existence is categorically ordered. In the second
critique this impossibility leads us to the postulate of immortality: we infinitely strive
to the accomplishment of the task. In the article of 1784 the conclusion reads: because
the realization of the whole task exceeds the limits and capacities of individual earthly
existence, the individual cannot be the addressee of the summons. Nature orders this
task to the species. The species is immortal, we die. Our goal is not happiness, but self-
sacrifice for the next generations.
* * *
22 Now, if the destination of the human being absolutely considered as a historical being
consists of following the goal of nature and that this goal is pursued by means of the
unsociable sociability, war, revolution, etc., can every act for the progress of humanity
be considered as a moral action? Another question: if the progress of humanity ordered
by  nature  implies  the  cultivation  of  reason  and  the  creation  of  institutions  that
guarantee freedom: is  Enlightenment really  an emancipation from nature or  a  free
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resolution to politically intervene in history in order to accelerate the hidden plan of
nature?
23 Before we leave Kant for entering in the Fichtean universe, we have to admit that this
consideration of  cosmopolitanism in IaG is  incompatible  with the other versions of
Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which agree with the main concepts, principles and lines of
his  philosophical  program.  We  have  mentioned  two  main  problems:  the  first  one
concerns the method: Kant works genetically and the whole argument is apagogical, a
kind of demonstration Kant actually rejects in the theory of method of his first critique.
44 The second one concerns the postulate of immortality of the soul: morals and politics
clash with each other, but whereas in Perpetual Peace Kant seems to pose morals above
politics,45 in his article of 1784 we see Kant inverting this hierarchy as a solution.
 
Fichte
24 No doubt, Fichte’s cosmopolitanism lacks the diversity of perspectives, nuances and the
historical  awareness of  the Kantian account.  Although this  is  correct,  this  does not
mean that we cannot find or reconstruct different forms of cosmopolitanism in Fichte’s
philosophy. Hence, before I analyze the Fichtean version of the epistemological and
ontologico-political cosmopolitanism, I would like to very briefly show to what extent
Fichte’s  philosophy  offers  a  religious,  a  moral,  an  educational  and  economic
cosmopolitanism as well.
25 The core of Fichte’s religious cosmopolitanism is to be found in his conviction that there is
a universal religion above all particular ones. Fichte follows the Enlightenment credo
that  there  is  a  religion  in  which  all  men  agree.  This  universal  religion,  which
constitutes  the  essence  of  every  historically  determined  religion,  is  based  on  the
premise  that  all  rational  individuals  possess  the  same  moral  capacity  and  can
understand the necessity and validity of universal moral principles. Unlike particular
religions,  conditioned  through  the  Zeitgeist,  history  and  culture,  universal  religion
refers to a natural disposition of man to transcend the limits of given experience.46
Sharing the same natural disposition and moral faculties makes all individuals member
of the same invisible church, of which each existing religion is the manifestation.47
26 Fichte’s moral cosmopolitanism arises every time he deals with the unity of humanity in
terms of  a  moral  community  of  the  idea  of  such a  universal  communion of  moral
individuals.48 But the moral formation of individuals needs culture and culture basically
consists of education and, concerning the social aspect of subjectivities,  education in
cosmopolitan values.49
27 What about economic cosmopolitanism? In the Kantian account, free world trade or free
market economy is crucial for the development of the real conditions of possibility for
legal cosmopolitanism. Kant understands free world trade as a manifestation of the
antagonism that characterizes human beings and States.50 On the contrary, according
to Fichte perpetual peace, which is “the only rightful relation among States”,51 can be
reached,  only  if  we  actually  proceed in  the  opposite  way,  namely:  obstructing  and
impeding free market. This is the conclusion of his protectionist treatise on Political
Economy Closed Commercial State.52 Fichte seems to have no confidence in the cunning of
nature Kant thought to have discovered. Fichte’s proposal for a political praxis towards
perpetual  peace  is  precisely  an  anti-natural  move:  neutralization or  sublimation of
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desire. However, there is passage in Fichte’s Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters
where  Fichte  seems  to  agree  with  Kant  about  the  advantages  for  the  progress  of
Humanity human antagonism brings about when it is guided through nature.53 But these
pages can be considered as the exception that confirms the rule. In this passage, Fichte
talks  about  a  cosmopolitan  sense  (Weltbürgersinne)  for  considering  human history.54
Hence, there is for Fichte a kind of cosmopolitan point of view and consequently an
epistemological  cosmopolitanism  as  well.  Like  Kant,  Fichte  defends  the  idea  of  a
cosmopolitan consideration of human history and destiny in teleological terms: there is
a  plan,  there is  a  goal,  there is  providence.  But  Fichte  is  not  as  radical  as  Kant  in
secularizing the history and the destiny of humanity. Nature is for Fichte not the real
name for providence. Human destiny goes beyond the limits of this life and this earth.
28 In his  Letters  to  Konstant,  published in 1802 in the journal  Eleusinien des  neunzehnten
Jahrhunderts  oder  Resultate  vereinigter  Denker  über  Philosophie  und  Geschichte  der
Freimaurerei,  we  find  an  attempt  at  explaining  epistemological  cosmopolitanism. 
According  to  Fichte  the  goal  of  Freemasonry  is  the  same  goal  of  humanity  as
historically  situated:  the  “common  cultivation  of  the  pure  human  being”.55 For
achieving this goal there are according to Fichte three steps man has to accomplish:
firstly,  the  creation  of  a  pure  moral  and  religious  community,  secondly  the
establishment of an absolute state of law on domestic and international levels, and,
thirdly,  the  total  dominance  of  nature  under  the  authority  of  rational  will.56 The
cultivation of a cosmopolitan sense concerns the second step.
29 In all three tasks Freemasonry can contribute to elevate citizens above individual and
social egoism so they develop a perspective on moral, religious, political, cultural and
scientific  issues  that  coincides  with the point  of  view of  the human being as  such,
namely the individual absolutely emancipated from historical and cultural biases.57 Like
Kant, this elevation does not mean that individuals arrive at a neutral point of view.
But  unlike Kant,  Fichte  conceives  cultivation,  culture and work for  the progress  of
humanity within a horizon of transcendence, since the main principle in his lectures on
Freemasonry reads: “the final goal of the human existence is absolutely not to be found
in this present world. This first life is only preparation and germ of a higher existence”.58 This
world is not the only one nor the higher one. This world is teleologically subordinated
to a higher existence. The relativization of this world can be seen in Fichte’s conviction
that cosmopolitanism, as Kant understands it, is inconsistent, since “there is no world
other than the moral world”.59 The human being is a goal in itself and the cultivation of
its potentialities is a component of the absolute or, better, of the real goal in itself.
30 According  to  Fichte,  what  we  need  for  the  political  progress  of  humanity  are
cosmopolitan  minded  citizens.  Because  the  cosmopolitan  point  of  view  let  people
critically consider their own nation-state, laws and customs.60 So, only a cosmopolitan
minded national citizen can positively contribute to the political progress of his or her
own  state.  This  progress  implies  of  course  establishment  of  rational  (rightful)
international relations. But the international order Fichte proposes, is only possible if
the  representatives  of  each  nation-state  are  cosmopolitan  minded,  because  Fichte
thinks of this solution not as result  of  social  antagonism, but as a result  of  mutual
renounce to imperialist pretentions. Again: Kant’s nature as (sadistic) providence has
disappeared  in  Fichte’s  account.  Instead,  Fichte appeals  to  individual  freedom  and
altruism as the motor of history.
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31 Peace  on  earth  is  according  to  Fichte  only  possible  through  an  unconditional  and
universal renounce to imperialism. For this purpose, the progress of Humanity needs
authorities educated in cosmopolitan values and capable of considering political affairs
from  a  cosmopolitan point  of  view.  Although  the  establishment  of  a  rational
international state of law needs cosmopolitan minded politicians, law of nations and
cosmopolitan law are two very different things in the Fichtean philosophy of right.
Neither  international  order  nor  the  principles  for  a  confederation  of  nations  is
according to Fichte a matter of cosmopolitan law. Fichte considers that cosmopolitan
law concerns the relation between states and individuals without state or belonging to a
state that is not recognized by the state the individual wants to enter.61
32 Cosmopolitan right is for Fichte “the right to go about freely on the earth and offer to
establish rightful  connections with others”.62 This  right is,  according to Fichte “the
original  human right  which precedes  all  rightful  contracts  and which alone  makes
them possible”, namely “the right to every other human being’s expectation to be able
to enter into a rightful relation with him through contracts”.63
33 Hence, cosmopolitan right is the only human right that belongs to the human being as
such: the right to be able to acquire rights. The original character of cosmopolitan right
refers to the fact that it is a right that does not depend on conventions or contracts, it
is  right based on human nature.  Cosmopolitan right is  inherent to the being of  the
human being. In dealing with a law problem Fichte brings us back to ontology. The
cosmopolitan  understood  as  individual  without  citizenship  coincides  with  the
individual as the political  basis for the creation of a state of law: both are situated
outside of  the scope of  any state,  both have the right and capacity for  entering in
rightful relations with other individuals and states. The pre-contractual subject of the
beginning  of  the  deduction  of  right  in  Fichte’s  Foundation  of  Natural  Right  and  the
cosmopolitan deduced at the end of the same work are situated in the domain of moral
consciousness depicted in the schema of hierarchic structures of all level of political
intersubjectivity in Fichte’s writing on the French Revolution.64 So, cosmopolitan law
and the concept of the cosmopolitan close the circle of Fichte’s political ontology.
34 The cosmopolitan is the individual without positive rights and because of this is the
only  one  capable  of  creating  new  rightful  relations.  Essentially  it  is  the  same
subjectivity that is involved in the social contract, in the right of revolution and in the
political and cultural cultivation and education of humanity.
 
Conclusions
35 As a conclusion I would like to sum up some points of the present paper that can help
for outlining further research in the cosmopolitan theories of Kant and Fichte:
36 i)  A  close  reading  of  Kant’s  IaG  does  not  only  show  that  epistemological
cosmopolitanism  is  related  to  the  idea  of  an  ontological  continuity  where  reason
appears as a product of nature, nature is redefined as a secularized version of providence
and the political idea of cosmopolitanism is deduced as a result of a natural process, but
also sheds light in internal conceptual and methodological tensions within the Kantian
philosophy. Tensions that make every attempt at bringing a harmonious image of the
Kantian  universe  appear  a  little  bit  suspicious.  Integrating  in  the  very-well  known
variations  of  Kant’s  cosmopolitanism  its  ontologico-political  version  serves  for
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abandoning the research hypothesis of a compatibility in Kant’s cosmopolitanisms or at
least for reconsidering the limits and usefulness of such an hypothesis.
37 ii) Fichte’s philosophy offers like the Kantian a diversity of forms of cosmopolitanism.
Unlike  the  Kantian  cosmopolitanisms,  there  are  no  methodological  or  conceptual
short-circuits,  since  in  dealing  with  cosmopolitanism,  Fichte  does  not  abandon  his
metaphysical  presuppositions.  But  his  decision for  transcendence  and metaphysical
freedom does not let him to consider human historicity in its own complexity. Contrary
to  Kant’s  proposal,  Fichte’s  cosmopolitan  remains  a  sojourner in  this  world.
Nevertheless, according to Fichte this way of living on earth is a true or authentic way
of dwelling in the world because it follows the last goal of rational beings. It is quite
interesting  to  observe  how  the  issue  of  epistemological,  cultural  and  educational
cosmopolitanism makes Fichte a little bit aware of historicity. It is also true that the
issue  of  Freemasonry  contributes  also  for  the  development  of  a  kind  of  historical
awareness in Fichte’s philosophy. Fichte had to justify the necessity of secret societies,
of groups working (conspiring) outside of the scope of the State. But Fichte’s awareness
of the inherence of historicity to the rational being has its limits. He cannot admit that
positive side Kant saw in war and social antagonism. For Fichte cosmopolitanism or
better peacefully international order is only possible by means of the renouncement of
all  states  to  any  kind  of  imperialism.  The  principle  seems  to  read:  the  fewer  the
contacts among states are, the better this is for peace on earth and moral progress of
humanity.
38 iii)  Kant  and  Fichte’s  cosmopolitan  theories  encompass  a  cosmopolitan  political
ontology.  By both philosophers,  the cosmopolitan component is  inherent to human
ontology. In this regard, the word ‘cosmopolitan’ ceases to be a predicate and becomes
a noun, the subject of an enunciation. By both philosophers, cosmopolitan ontology
serves for the legitimation of  a  cosmopolitan view of  politics.  By each philosopher,
these terms acquire a different content, the discourse has a different epistemological
status,  the  nature  of  the  postulated  necessity  differs  as  well.  In  dealing  with
cosmopolitanism, both philosophers offer original insights. Kant develops a philosophy
of history wherein nature and reason are communicated in an ontological continuity
that  clashes  with  some  main  points  of  his  critical  philosophical  program.  It  is  a
secularized history of salvation that can be considered as a theologico-political reading
of  human nature.  In the legal  treatment of  cosmopolitanism, Fichte gives the term
cosmopolitan a new meaning: she is the human being as such in three different views:
in its immediacy as pre-contractual existing free or moral being, secondly, as citizen
artificially stripped off of all legal-institutional mediations, and, thirdly, as lacking any
citizenship at all.
39 iv) In Fichte’s philosophy, like in the Kantian account, the cosmopolitan becomes flesh,
but she does not have primarily to be identified with the merchants and intellectuals in
Königsberg,  the  Dutch  in  Japan  or  the  British  in  India.  Fichte  seems  to  be  more
interested in the other extreme of capitalism: the individual without any citizenship at
all or without any right, the illegal migrant, the refugee. In her lacking of citizenship
and  rights,  the  cosmopolitan  incarnates  a  summons  for  creating  the  needed  legal
framework that can positively integrate this outside of legality. From a Fichtean point
of view we could say that today refugee crisis is a call to reinventing international and
cosmopolitan law as well as rethinking Europe and nation-states.
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40 v)  The  main  point  of  divergence  between  both  philosophers  concerning
cosmopolitanism seems to be their conceptions of nature and their attitude toward
secularization  and  immanence/transcendence.  Other  differences,  for  instance  their
philosophies of history, their view on economy and human progress, their expectations
about  and  hope  in  what  human  consciously  can  bring  about  for  the  progress  of
humanity,  can be grouped as  deduced from the opposition in their  conceptions on
nature and the limits of human existence.
NOTES
1. I  cited  Kant’s  writings  from  KANT,  I.,  Gesammelte  Schriften  (AA),  ed.  Vol.  1-22  Preussische
Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab vol.
24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1900ff., following the list of
Sigla  proposed  by  the  Kant-Studien  https://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/
s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf (seen on 12/09/2017). I cited Fichte’s writings from
FICHTE, J. G., Gesamtausgabe (GA), ed. by LAUTH, R. et al., Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1964ff..
2. The most representative studies are KLEINGELD,  P., Kant and Cosmopolitanism.  The Philosophical
Ideal  of  World  Citizenship.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2012;  CAVALLAR,  G.,  Kant’s
Embedded Cosmopolitanism. History, Philosophy and Education for World Citizens. Berlin: De Gruyter,
2015.
3. IaG, AA 08:18 and 30. See also the papers on this Kantian writing collected in Oksenberg Rorty,
A.  &  Schmidt,  J.,  Kant’s  Idea  for  a  Universal  History  with  a  Cosmopolitan  Aim.  A  Critical  Guide,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
4. See  for  instance  JAMES,  D.,  Fichte's  Republic:  Idealism,  History  and  Nationalism,  Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015; GODDARD, J-Chr. et al., Fichte et la politique, Milano: Polimetrica,
2009 and RADRIZZANI, I., “Ist Fichtes Modell des Kosmopolitismus pluralistisch”, in: Fichte-Studien 2
(1990), pp. 7-19.
5. Zöller, G. & JAMES, D. (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Fichte, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2016.
6. CAVALLAR, G., “Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s Philosophy”, in: Ethics and Global Policy 5/2 (2012),
pp. 95-118 and Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism.
7. CAVALLAR, G., “Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s Philosophy”, pp. 99-100 and 113-114, fn. 19.
8. CAVALLAR, G., Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism, p. 28.
9. Ib.pp. 23-27 and 86-87.
10. Ib. p. 5.
11. Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, AA 15: 518.
12. Ib. p. 24.
13. Ib. p. 5.
14. Ib. p. 25-26.
15. CAVALLAR, G., “Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s Philosohy”, pp. 102.
16. IaG  08:17-18  and  29-30.  See  also  RAULET,  G.  “La  téléologie  critique  et  ses  paradigmes
scientifiques”,  in:  Con-textos  kantianos  1  (2015),  p.  34  and  WOOD,  A.  W.,  “Kant’s  Philosophy  of
Revisiting Kant and Fichte’s Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 16 | 2018
11
History”, in: KLEINGELD, P. (ed.), Toward Perpetual Peace and other Writings on Politics, Peace and
History, New York: Yale University Press, 2006, pp. 245. 
17. IaG, AA 08: 17 and 28.
18. See  for  instance KrV B 490-504 and GA I/3,  75-90 (Über  Belebung und Erhöhung des  reinen
Interesse für Wahrheit, 1795).
19. IaG, AA 08:30.
20. IaG, AA 08:28. See also WA, AA 08:39.
21. LACLAU, E., On Populist Reason, London: Verso, 2005, pp. 67-72.
22. ZeF, AA 08:369.
23. IaG, AA 08:20.
24. ZeF, AA 08:367 fn..
25. KLEINGELD, P. “Kant’s Changing Cosmopolitanism”, in RORTY, A. O. & SCHMIDT, J. (eds.) Kant's Idea
for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009, p. 179.
26. IaG, AA 08:20-22, 24-26 and 30; ZeF, AA 08:360-368.
27. Anth, AA 09:330-333.
28. IaG, AA 08: 18, 20-22 and 24.
29. IaG, AA 08:17, 20-21 and 27.
30. IaG, AA 08:17 and 30.
31. ZeF, AA 08:363 and 368.
32. IaG, AA 08:27.
33. IaG, AA 08:468.
34. IaG AA 08:30.
35. See for instance MENTZEL, H., Gründliche Anleitung, billig und recht nach göttlicher Absicht von der
Freyheit des Menschen zu urtheilen, Leipzig/Bresslau, 1739; BENGEL, J. A., Erklärte Offenbarung Johannis
oder vielmehr Jesu Christi, Stuttgart, 1740, p. 345 and CHRISTLIEB, W. B., Gründliche Beurtheilung des
Zeit-Punkts  darinnen wir  nach der Offenbarung Jesu Christi  gegenwertig  [sic]  leben,  Frankfurt a.M./
Leipzig, 1758, p. 30.
36. AA 15:517.
37. IaG, AA 08:30.
38. RezHerder, AA 08:52-55.
39. IaG AA 08:17-18.
40. IaG AA 08:20 and 30. See also WA, AA 08:41.
41. For a more exhaustive analysis of Kant’s cocnept of nature in IaG see my “Racionalização da
Natureza: Cosmopolitismo kantiano como uma predisposição natural?”, in: Studia Kantiana v. 14
n. 21 (2016) pp. 55-76.
42. IaG, AA 08:19-20.
43. KpV, AA 05:122-124.
44. KrV B 817-822.
45. ZeF, AA 08:380.
46. See for instance GA II/1, 287-291 (Einige Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus, 1790); GA I/1,
19-21 (Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung, 1792/93); GA I/5, 348 (Ueber den Grund unsers Glaubens
an eine göttliche Weltregierung, 1798); GA I/8, 446-447 (Philosophie der Maurerei. Briefe an Konstant,
1802) GA II/5, 136 (Rückerinnerungen, Antworten und Fragen, 1799); GA I/9, 68-69 (Die Anweisung zum
seeligen Leben, 1806); GA II/12, 333 (Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, 1811).
47. See  for  instance  GA  I/1,  371  (Beitrag  zur  Berichtigung  des  Publikums  über  die  französische
Revolution,  1793);  GA  I/5,  213  and  303-304  (Das  System  der  Sittenlehre  nach  den  Principien  der
Wissenschaftslehre, 1798).
Revisiting Kant and Fichte’s Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 16 | 2018
12
48. See for instance GA I/2, 89 (Über die Würde des Menschen, 1794); GA I/8, 197-202 (Die Grundzüge
des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, 1806).
49. See for instance GA II/7, 12-13 (Aphorismen über Erziehung, 1804) GA II/9, 366 (Ideen für die
innere Organisation der Universität Erlangen (1806) and GA I/10, 189 (Reden an die deutsche Nation,
1808).
50. IaG, AA 08:27, see also ZeF AA 08:367.
51. GA I/4, 162 (Grundlage des Naturrechts nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre, 1796/97).
52. GA I/7, 119, 138 and 141 (Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, 1800).
53. GA I/8, 361-363 (Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, 1806).
54. GA I/8, 363.
55. GA I/8, 431 (Philosophie der Maurerei. Briefe an Konstant, 1802).
56. GA I/8, 440.
57. GA I/8, 426.
58. GA I/8, 439.
59. GA II/12, 118 (Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseyns, 1810/11)
60. GA I/8, 450 (Philosophie der Maurerei).
61. GA I/4, 163 (Grundlage des Naturrechts).
62. GA I/4, 164.
63. GA I/4, 163.
64. GA I/1, 279 (Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publikums über die französische Revolution,
1793/94)
ABSTRACTS
In this paper, I present some preliminary considerations on relevant, but, as far as I know, still
unexplored, aspects of the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions of cosmopolitanism. These aspects
can  be  grouped  in  three  thematic  axes:  the  ontologico-political  (not  legal)  side  of  the
cosmopolitan  conceptions  of  both  philosophers,  the  existence  of  a  diversity  of  forms  of
cosmopolitanism in Fichte’s philosophy, and the idea and role of nature, economy and history in
Kant and Fichte’s cosmopolitanism.
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